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Introduction
The influence of political and social institutions on economic development is a 
major question developed by institutional economics. Naturally, the relationship 
between   patent   system   and   economic   performance   has   been   explored   by 
economists and historians. In her book published in 2005, B. Zorina Khan tended 
to show that this link was not uniform. By comparing Great-Britain, France and 
United States, she suggested that American economic performance was based on a 
« democratization of invention », which was allowed by its own patent system. 
Contrary to the American one, the « philosophy and enforcement of intellectual 
property in Britain and in France, the structure of patent and copyright systems, 
and the resulting patterns of invention, were all consistent with the oligarchic 
nature of European society. »
1  Further she added : « The European systems 
reflected their origin in royal privilege and effectually limited access to a select 
class,   which   ultimately   resulted   consequences   for   their   long   run 
competitiveness. »
2
Considering the French case under Toqueville's authority, B. Zorina Khan insisted 
on the continuity between the «privilege mentality» of the Ancien régime and the 
patent system built by the Revolution. For her, the revolutionary rupture has only 
a rhetoric meaning. French mercantilist policies remained during the XIX
th 
century.   Mistrust   toward   foreign   inventions,   strong   involvement   « in   the 
discretionary promotion of invention » and preference for secret remained the 
essential features of French patterns of invention and conduced to promote rent-
seeking activities, which were unfavourable to competitiveness.
The opposite view that we will defend in this paper is not based on patriotic 
reasons, even if we think that France contributed modestly to the history of 
democracy. Zorina Khan's point of view may be considered as partially irrelevant 
because it prevents from understanding correctly the freezing development of 
French patent system
3. It is necessary to analyse more precisely the nature of the 
revolutionary break, without assuming too quickly a continuity between the 
Ancien Régime and the Revolution. Further we have not only to understand if the 
French patent system was democratic but also to wonder if its (in)efficiency was 
the result of political and social factors.
The revolutionary break
Admittedly, many of the problems relating to the right of the inventor appeared on 
long before the French Revolution. The royal declaration on privileges for 
inventors in 1762 was a moment of drawing a new conception of privileges, 
which depended on the strong debates  about the economic regulation. As 
1 B. Zorina Khan,  The Democratization of Invention : Patents and Copyright in American 
Development, 1790-1920, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2005, p. 6.
2 Ibidem, p. 29.
3 This paper is based on my book : Gabriel Galvez-Behar,  La République des inventeurs : 









































0demonstrated by Liliane Pérez' work, the invention was the subject, early in the 
XVIII
th century, to an administrative mobilization, which was amplified by the 
spread of encyclopédisme
4. Thanks to this process, the inventor acquired a new 
dimension: John Locke's principles and those of natural law legitimized the claims 
of intellectual property, already widely perceived by Denis Diderot
5. Since the 
Enlightenment, the rights of creators on their works were a rallying point for 
many artists, concerning liberal or useful arts. At the very end of the  Ancien 
Régime this trend became stronger. In the 1780s, even as the exclusive privilege 
was   the   subject   of   considerable   criticism,   many   agreed   that   transitional 
monopolies could be granted to inventors. Inspired by the British model of 
patents, the French royal administration facilitated the issuance of privileges in 
inventions, while easing procedures of prior expertise. In return, it required of 
privileges holders the deposit of their inventions in order to promote the 
development of the industrial knowledge. Recognition of the natural right of 
inventor, issuing temporary privileges to reward and to allow the access to the 
market and the disclosure of inventions, these were the three features of a model, 
which appeared even before the Revolution.
The Revolution of inventors (1791) 
The Revolution accelerated this process. The first feature of the revolutionary 
genesis of the patent was the strong lobbying of inventors' associations in the 
development of the new patent law. At the end of the  Ancien Régime  some 
associations devoted to the promotion of art and science had came to light. The 
Revolution promoted the development of new societies defending inventors' 
rights. One of them, the  Société des inventions et des découvertes  played an 
important role. Its first president, Claude-Urbain de Retz, baron de Servières, 
could be seen as a member of the République des lettres but had, in the same time, 
an experience of business
6. At the eve of the Revolution, he was in touch with 
famous savants such as Séguier, Chaptal and Lavoisier, whereas he was managing 
a factory of nitrates near Nimes. On bad terms with his family, he was in Paris in 
1789 and became, two years  later  probably, president of the  Société des 
inventions. At the lead of a delegation of « artistes-inventeurs », he presented in 
September 1790 a petition to the Comité d'agriculture et du commerce, which 
demanded the establishment in France of a patent law like in England. The 
Comité nominated a rapporteur, who was probably inspired by Servières himself, 
the chevalier Stanislas de Boufflers
7.
Born in 1738, raised in the atmosphere of the enlightened court of Lunéville, the 
4 L. Hilaire-Pérez, L’invention technique au siècle des Lumières, Paris, Albin Michel, 2000. 
5 See D. Diderot, « Lettre historique et politique sur le commerce de la librairie », in id., Œuvres 
complètes, Paris, Garnier frères, 1876, p. 30. On this issue, see L. Hilaire-Pérez, « Diderot’s 
views on artists’ and inventors’ rights : invention, imitation and reputation », British Journal 
for the History of Science, vol. 35, n° 2, juin 2002, p. 129-150. 
6 On Servières, see Christiane Demeulanaere-Douyère, “Inventeurs en Révolution : la Société 
des inventions et découvertes (1790-1791)”, La technique et la science au miroir du bien 
public dans l’Europe des Lumières, XIIème Congrès International des Lumières. Sciences, 
Techniques et Cultures au XVIIIe siècle, Montpellier, 8-15 juillet 2007, forthcoming. See also 
our working paper, “Genèse des droits de l'inventeur et promotion de l'invention sous la 
Révolution   française”,   on   line   :  http://halshs.archives-
ouvertes.fr/docs/00/06/68/35/PDF/INVREVGGB.pdf
7 On Boufflers, see Nicole Vaget Grangeat, Le chevalier de Boufflers et son temps. Étude d’un 








































0chevalier de Boufflers became a member of the Académie française in 1788 after 
being governor of Senegal. Representative of the nobility from the bailiwick of 
Nancy to the États-Généraux then to the Constituent Assembly, Stanislas de 
Boufflers joined the Comité d'agriculture et de commerce and he presented the 
Rapport sur la propriété des auteurs de nouvelles découvertes et inventions en 
tout genre d'industrie on December 30, 1790. Boufflers was clearly inspired by 
Diderot's arguments, pointing out that « if there is a genuine property to a man, it 
is his thought. » 
8 For him, the inventions were considered as inventor's products, 
which property has to be secured.
Boufflers proposed a bill, whose main features were based on these principles, 
and he suggested a clear contract between inventors and society. As long as the 
inventor kept his invention secret in his own mind, he remained its absolute 
master. However, in order to take effectively advantages from it, he should 
disclose it and then he could be dispossessed. If the society could protect his 
rights, this protection had a strong price because of the particular nature of this 
immaterial object. In order to compensate the society for this cost, the inventor 
must not only renounce the secret by providing an exact knowledge of his 
invention, which was a sine qua non condition for effective protection, but it also 
must give up its rights after an interval of time.
Although temporary, this protection was considered as the result of a natural right 
and the contract imagined by the chevalier de Boufflers did away with hassle 
previously imposed on inventors. In this framework, patent examination by the 
administration had no legitimacy. Whether conducted by scholars or by members 
of corporations, such an examination was, in Boufflers' eyes, necessarily arbitrary 
because it established « a court judging for things that do not yet exist. »
9 For him 
the administration was unable to take a decision on the usefulness of new things, 
which could only be labelled by the public opinion. In January 1791, Boufflers' 
bill became the first patent law in France.
The later was immediately contested by those, who considered that patents were 
useless privileges. Again the action of the Société des inventions was essential. 
For these inventors, the patent law tended precisely to make an end with 
privileges system because inventor's rights were recognized as a natural and “ 
inalienable human” one. Thanks to a strong lobbying, a second patent law, 
confirming the first one, was adopted in May 1791. In order to draw a strict 
distinction from the old privileges, it called the patents “brevets d'invention” and 
drew the new patent administration, which would be managed by Retz de 
Servières.
A slow and difficult diffusion 
The adoption of the French patent laws in 1791 did not cause any upheaval in the 
delivering of patents. On the contrary, in a first instance, granted patents were as 
numerous as applications for privileges at the end of Ancien Régime. In the 1780s 
16 applications were filed on average each year to the  Comité du commerce. 
Between 1791 and 1801, 15 patents were delivered each year. The number of 
patents continued to stagnate until the reign of Charles X
th (1824-1830), when it 
begun to rise rapidly. Thus, for nearly thirty years, the patents were slowly being 
8 D. Diderot, « Lettre historique et politique sur le commerce de la librairie », in id., Œuvres 
complètes, Paris, Garnier frères, 1876, p. 30.








































0adopted, which was concentrated in certain industries and in certain areas. In fact, 
between 1791 and 1803, mechanical, textile and chemical industries concentrated 
almost half of the patents (respectively 21%, 19% and 7.5 %). In addition, the 
weight of Paris and its region appeared overwhelming. In the first years of 
enforcement, nearly three quarters of patents were taken in the department of the 
Seine ; in the 1830s as Parisian patents represented less than half of the patents 
granted
10.
The uses of patents in Northern France confirm this idea of a slow and hesitant 
diffusion. The number of patents registered in the first decades of existence of 
patent law was extremely limited in this area, which was becoming however an 
important industrial centre  in France
11. According to Jean-Pierre Hirsch,  « not 
only the share of patents granted in this Mecca of the industrialization of the 
nineteenth   century  [did   not  reach]   even  3%  corresponding   to  the   relative 
importance of its people, » but the number of patents relating to the northerner 
textile industry, industrie-phare in this French department, was ridiculously low. 
In fact, Northerner industrialists had a mixed feeling toward the new patent 
system.
This mistrust appeared as soon as the patent system was established, which 
became immediately subject of fierce criticism. The first reason was probably its 
costs which was prohibitive. The patent tax was indeed very expensive : for a 15 
years patent, it raised 1500 francs whereas worker's wage was 1,5 francs a day at 
the beginning of XIX
th century. Added to other administrative costs, this tax made 
the French patents inaccessible to many inventors. Besides, the heaviness of 
litigation was another stumbling block. A member of the Conseil général des 
manufactures  said in 1819 that « the prosecution, that the patent holders are 
obliged to undertake, frighten many artists, especially in the departments, and 
prevents them from taking patents.»
12 Four years later in 1823 Francœur, professor 
at the Faculty of Sciences in Paris, denounced not only that litigations were very 




Because of such shortcomings, the patent laws were subject to some adjustments. 
Anact of September 20, 1792 prevented from patenting financial methods. But 
more radical projects also appeared trying to undermine the compromise imposed 
in 1791. Entrusted by the Conseil des Cinq-Cents to prepare a report on patent 
law, Jean-François Eudes asked on 14 Pluviôse an VI (3 February 1796) that 
patents were issued only after a "mature consideration"
14. This apparent challenge 
to the principle of non-examination of patents caused, in turn, so strong reactions, 
that Eudes had to abandon his project. In 1811 the Conseil général des fabriques 
10 On these figures, see J. Girardin et Ballin, « Essai sur les brevets d'invention », in Association 
normande, Annuaire des cinq départements de l'ancienne Normandie, Caen, Impr. Le Roy, 
1841, p. 527-540.
11 J.-P. Hirsch, « À propos des brevets d'invention dans les entreprises du Nord au XIXe siècle », 
Revue du Nord, vol. 67, n° 265, avril-juin 1985, p. 447 -459. 
12 Archives nationales (désormais AN), F12 196 bis, séance du 23 décembre 1819 
13 Dictionnaire technologique ou nouveau dictionnaire universel des arts et métiers,  Paris, 
Thomine et Fortic, 1823, p. 461-473. 
14 J.-F. Eude, Rapport au Conseil des Cinq-Cents, cité in A. Huard, Répertoire de législation et 








































0et des manufactures intended to reform the patent laws but its work remained 
unsuccessful. In 1814, the issue was raised again, without further success. In 
1821, the same commission addressed the issue again and again things were 
dragging on until the Minister of Trade revived the project in 1826
15. Patents 
becoming more and more important, the Minister of Trade, the Comte de Saint-
Cricq convened in October 1828 a commission to prepare a new patent law.
Chaired by Girod (de l'Ain), this commission included famous industrialists (such 
Ternaux),   lawyers   (as   Charles-Augustin   Renouard)   or   scientists   (Baron 
Thénard)
16. Because of the complexity of the problem, the commission undertook 
a wide consultation, whose results reflected the different uses of the patent
17. Rare 
were those who, like the Société des arts et des sciences of Lille, called for the 
abolition of patents in favor of a system of rewards. Instead, most considered the 
patent as the best way to give special rights to inventors. On many other points, 
however, opinions were much more divergent. The examination, claimed by 
chambers of commerce of Boulogne, Montpellier and Tours, was rejected by those 
of Lyons, Marseilles and Paris.
Contrary to its philosophical foundations, the revolutionary patent laws provided a 
protection only to inventors who were able to pay the cost. This feature could 
suggest that the French patent system was not democratic but other arguments 
have to be taken in consideration. The fact that rich Northerner industrialists could 
be reluctant to take patents because of its inefficiency intimates that the slow 
diffusion of patents was based on factors different from social ones. On the other 
hand, the refusal of preliminary examination proves that the revolutionary patent 
law was not based on the same philosophy than the system of privileges, which 
had begun to evolve at the end of Ancien régime. Moreover, the best proof of the 
revolutionary rupture is certainly the fact that the French patent system was not 
abolished despite the critics.
The 1844 patent law, or the contradictions of a liberal institution 
Fifteen years were necessary to make a new legislation on patents. Before this, 
political   turmoil   took   precedence   over   economic   discussions.   Under   the 
Monarchie de Juillet the reform was considered once more : in 1832, the Minister 
of Trade established again the commission created in 1828 and added the famous 
chemist Gay-Lussac and two other members. A year later, the commission 
adopted a report which was presented to the Conseil général de l'agriculture, du 
commerce et des manufactures only in 1837. A bill was proposed to the Chambre 
des pairs at the beginning of 1843. More than a year of debates was necessary to 
adopt the new law, which was promulgated on July 5, 1844. This new French 
patent law would govern patents' legislation until 1968.
The 1844 patent law: a new deal ? 
Contrary to the 1791 laws, the Act of July 5, 1844 did not include any preamble to 
define its philosophical principles. To the contrary, the government had wanted to 
avoid any discussion about the metaphysical nature of inventor's right. Despite 
this commitment, the representative Philippe Dupin, rapporteur to the Chambre 
15 AN, F12 196 bis: Meetings of November 18, 1824, 20 October 1825 and April 6, 1826.
16 A. Huard, Répertoire...., op.cit., p. 16.
17 Recueil industriel, manufacturier, agricole et commercial,  n° 39, février 1830, p. 119-153, 








































0des députés, came back to the philosophical foundations of the debate in order to 
make the new law steadfast. In his eyes, the idealist aspect of invention prevented 
from identifying its property to a material one. For him « once delivered, once 
thrown into the vast fund of human knowledge, an idea is not more likely to be 
the exclusive and jealous enjoyment, which is called property.»
18 As soon as the 
idea was proclaimed, it was impossible to forbid everyone to imitate it. To make 
sure that his property ownership would stay an « exclusive and jealous » one the 
inventor had only one solution: to be condemned to silence and inaction. On the 
other hand, by communicating his invention, he had in fact to abandon any claim 
to a perpetual and exclusive property.
To compensate this abandonment, the society had to reward the inventor for the 
usefulness of his invention by giving him the opportunity of an exclusive holding 
for a given period of time. To encourage the inventor to file his invention in the 
fund of knowledge, he had to be granted a temporary monopoly through « a real 
transaction, a contract, an exchange. »
19 Actually, in Dupin's eyes, property was 
substituted by the idea of an exchange and a contract. This weakening of the 
principle of invention's ownership was justified by the benefit of a contractual 
basis, already outlined by Boufflers but not in the same terms. This conception 
was not unanimously accepted and many people continued to defend an other one 
based on the natural right. However, if the law no longer considered the right of 
the inventor as a property one, it did not mean that the new right was granted by 
the government. In fact, the 1844 patent law continued to be based on the refusal 
to see the government delivering a privilege : the spirit of revolutionary laws and 
its natural right foundations seemed at last to be preserved.
Article   2   of   the  Act   defined   patentable   « inventions   or   discoveries »   by 
distinguishing three cases: the invention of new industrial products, the invention 
of new ways, the new application of known methods to produce a result or an 
industrial product. Thus the law did not consider the importance of the invention, 
which had only to meet two conditions: to be new and to have an industrial 
character. A method of cultivation or a method of reading were not considered as 
industrial, and they could not, therefore, be patented. The law also provided 
criteria   excluding   purely   theoretical   discoveries.   Products,   means   and   new 
applications were patentable according to the law and, contrary to popular belief, 
the 1844 patent law allowed the granting of patents to protect products as well as 
processes. Courts ensured, in some cases only, the primacy of one over the other.
One of the most important changes introduced by the new legislation concerned 
the cost of patents. Contrary to the previous one, the 1844 patent law allowed 
patentees to pay the tax during all the duration of their patent. In practice, patent 
costed 100 francs each year whereas workers' wage represented about 1,5 francs a 
day at mid XIX
th century. Although modest workers could not have yet an real 
access to patent, this effective fall of price allowed artisans or small entrepreneurs 
to use the patent system. Even if prosopographical studies on patentees are scarce, 
it appears that these new conditions explain the fast development of patents in the 
1850s.
18 A. Huard, Répertoire ..., op. cit., p. 235. It is impossible to present here all the details of the 
1844 patent law.








































0An ambiguous development of patents 
The 1844 patent act led to a considerable increase in the number of granted 
patents : between the late 1840s and early 1860s, the number of patents was 
multiplied by three. This  exponential development was focused on certain 
activities : in 1854, 13% of patents protected « chemical products » - but that 
denomination   covered   both   food,   cosmetics   and  dyestuffs-   and   12%  were 
belonged to « fine arts and musical instruments ». The steam engines and those 
applied to textile materials account for only 18% of the total
20. Although they had 
to be clarified by a more precise statistical analysis, these figures qualify the idea 
of an intensification of inventive activity in the first half of the 1850s and give 
more emphasis on the effect of reducing patent's costs. Thus the 1844 patent law 
undoubtedly   facilitated   diffusion   of   patent :   according   to   the   Chamber   of 
Commerce of Lille, the annual tax could be supported by no-wealthy inventors
21. 
In addition, the quite remarkable stabilization in the number of patents issued 
between 1858 and 1869 is easily explained by the controversy concerning 
industrial property (cf infra). Faced with the risk of patent law's collapse, many 
hesitated to invest in the patent.
Other factors lead to relativize this sudden increase in patents. Patents had, in fact, 
a short life expectancy. Nearly half of patents failed in the two first years and less 
than 10% only exceed the tenth year
22. This high « infant mortality » of patents 
was coupled with the stagnation of assignments. Since 1791, patents could be sold 
but assigned patents had to be declared and published in the Bulletin des lois. 
Between 1844 and 1846, 186 assignments were, on average, published annually ; 
between 1849 and 1851, probably because of the political upheavals of the time, 
the figure dropped to 37. Between 1854 and 1856, 144 disposals were recorded 
each year, 202 between 1859 and 1861. In sum, although these figures have to be 
treated with caution, they indicate that the number of durable patents and covered 
transactions did not increase in the same proportions as patents in general.
From a philosophical point of view, it appears clearly that the French patent 
system was based on natural right and this conception appeared democratic since 
every inventor had the right to have his invention protected by the law. Obviously, 
the cost of patent limited in practice this ideal but the patent legislation was based 
on new foundations. By falling the concrete price of patent, the 1844 patent law 
ensured a democratization of patent, which conduced to a strong increase of the 
number of delivered patents. However, despite this new development, the French 
patent system did not work better.
The rule and its uses 
The study of the number and life expectancy of patents  corroborates the 
contemporaries'   impression   of  a   proliferation   of   ephemeral   patents   and   of 
litigations. Was this last perception justified ? In the first years of application of 
the 1844 patent law, the number of cases brought before civil or criminal courts 
20 Figures established from the  Catalogue des brevets d'invention pris du 1er janvier au 31 
décembre 1854, Paris, Bouchard-Huzard, 1855. 
21 Archives départementales du Nord (now ADN), 76 J 1792, August 1855. 
22 On the figures concerning the years 1860, 1865 et 1870, see G. Galvez-Behar, La République 
des inventeurs, op. cit.. On the figures concerning the year 1844/1845, see « Circulaire adressé 
par M. le directeur général de l'Agriculture et du Commerce à MM. les présidents des 








































0was increasing quite quickly
23. Anyway, these figures show a sharp increase in 
litigation between 1846 and 1858, which is obviously to compare with that of 
patents themselves. However, whether civil or correctional court, if we compare 
the number of cases decided in the first instance to the number of patents that 
might be in force, the rate tended to drop from 1845 to 1866 and stabilised after.
In 1850, the Minister of Commerce recognized the inconsistency of court 
decisions since "such a patent, valid in a jurisdiction court, is void in the neighbor 
one ; such an act is qualified  as counterfeiting in Paris and elsewhere this same 
act   escapes   any   repression."
24.   Four   years   later,   the   General   Director   of 
Agriculture and Commerce said in turn that "under the new law, it has not seen a 
decline in the number of trials in which the patents give rise constantly, they have 
rather increased
25. In 1856, faced with these problems and limited powers of 
judges in the technical matter, Charles Laboulaye claimed, unsuccessfully, the 
introduction of "industrial consular courts" elected in the manner of commercial 
courts and charged with judging the trials relating to patents
26.
Contrary to the public opinion, these statistics underline the scarcity of litigations, 
which resulted from the high mortality outlined above but, probably, from the cost 
of procedures. Besides, these costs and the uncertainties of procedures promoted 
negotiated deals, which allowed a case-by-case definition of property rights, 
tended to shrink litigation. This relative scarcity, however, should not suggest that 
litigations had a marginal meaning since they were a moment test where property 
rights were more clearly defined. At last litigation was an horizon of expectations 
that suggested certain uses, in particular one way to write the patent. It was also a 
moment when the rules became more accurate. Also the relative stabilization of 
cases from 1860s can be attributed to the controversy already mentioned, but one 
must also take into consideration the progress of the court decisions, which 
improved legal information and made superfluous some trials.
Diffusing technical knowledge ?
The 1844 patent law faces very quickly, however, practical considerations. The 
application for a patent presupposes that the applicant can know prior patents so 
as not to see his own cancelled. Access to  granted patents, by viewing or by 
publishing them, is even more essential that, in the French patent system, the 
application is under the sole responsibility of the inventor. Besides, the knowledge 
based on patented inventions is necessary to ensure the validity of required 
patents. Patents are intended to be a fund of technical information improving new 
knowledge and, consequently, inventive activity. From a historical point of view, 
23 We must take great care with statistics from the Compte général de l'administration de la 
justice civile et commerciale  failing to learn more about their construction; those in the 
criminal justice system are more secure due to the relatively strict correctional courts in matters 
of counterfacting. On these statistical sources, see P. JOBERT, « Leçon des chiffres : le compte 
général de l'administration de la justice civile et commerciale au XIX
e siècle », in M. MERGER et 
D. BARJOT (dir.), Les entreprises et leurs réseaux : hommes, capitaux, techniques et pouvoirs. 
Mélanges en l'honneur de François Caron, Paris, Presses de l'Université Paris-Sorbonne, p. 67-
83.
24 ADN, 76 J b17d66. 
25 « Circulaire adressé par M. le directeur général de l'Agriculture et du Commerce à MM. les 
présidents des Chambres de commerce » citée in Louis Nouguier, Des brevets d'invention et de 
la contrefaçon, Paris, Cosse, 1856, p. 531. 
26 Bulletin de la Société d'encouragement pour l'industrie nationale, 2eme série, tome 3, mai 








































0all of these issues take on a special importance since Joel Mokyr has made 
« industrial Enlightenment» the main cause of the first Industrial Revolution
27. To 
what extent and under what conditions did patents contribute in France to this 
movement ? This facet of the French patent system needs now to be explored.
Actually, the revolutionary French patent laws had provided the publication of 
patents which were felt into the public domain. But only the decree of 17 
vendémiaire   VII   (October   8,   1798)   committed   really   this   task   to     the 
Conservatoire des arts et métiers
28. Therefore, the expired patents were studied by 
pupils of the school of drawing and descriptive geometry established at the 
Conservatoire
29. Clearly, this use of patents was at the core of a technological 
language, which emerged from the late XVIII
th century
30. The place of patents in 
the main technical litterature from the early XIX
th century may convince of that 
central role. However, access to patents in force was more complex. To allow the 
searches for antecedence, the 1791 patent laws made every citizen able to 
« consult the specifications of the various patents currently in office » (article 11). 
This possibility, however, was subject to a number of criticisms: in 1811, the 
commission established by the Conseil général des arts et manufactures claimed 
that patent descriptions were disclosed only on an Minister's order, who could 
refuse  consultation  depending  on  the   circumstances
31.  In  fact,   this   request 
reflected a certain distrust of inventors who did not accept to see their inventions 
known by the public, although they wanted to claim ownership on them. In total, 
if the publication of expired patents was clearly encouraged, concrete access to 
patents in force did not seem too convenient, even if some owners did not hesitate 
to publish their inventions in technical reviews.
Even if it allowed an access and a publishing of patents, the 1844 patent act did 
not really improve the situation. In fact, the government refused to effectively 
assume this task, which was essential for the proper functioning of liberal 
compromise. Having an efficient access to delivered patents was a necessary 
condition in order to make the patent system work, since it was founded on an 
non-examination of applications. But the publishing of patents did not fulfil the 
expectancies. In 1859, Charles Laboulaye denounced the shortcomings of the 
publication of patents:
"At long intervals, two or three years after the time the patent could be 
issued, when the novelty that had been searched no longer exists, is 
published a large volume in-4 °, with a high price, containing a multitude of 
patents more or less truncated, without any order and all sorts of topics. 
Anyone interested in one or two questions, which might have some interest 
to see five or six patents, is careful not to lose valuable time leafing through 
these volumes, avoid buying them, and this costly publication is, in reality, 
done almost in vain”
32.
27 Joel Mokyr, The Gifts of Athena. Historical Origins of the Knowledge Economy, Princeton, 
Princeton University Press, 2002. 
28 P. Molard, Description des machines et des procédés, Paris, Impr. Huzard, 1811, p. 111 
29 Ibidem, p. 4.On this school, see A. Mercier, « Les débuts de la "petite école". Un apprentissage 
graphique au Conservatoire sous l'Empire « , Cahiers de l'histoire du CNAM, n° 4, juillet 1994, 
p. 27-56. 
30 On the genesis of technology, see J. Mertens, « Technology as the science of the industrial 
arts : Louis-Sébastien Lenormand (1757-1837) and the popularization of technology », History 
and technology, vol. 18 , n° 3, 2002, p. 203-231 
31 AN, F12 194, séance du 27 mai 1811.
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0Six years later, before the Senate, the Minister of Trade recognized "that the 
publication of patents could not be done with the desired speed, because of the 
lack   of  resources   available   to  administration,  [which]  caused   the  delays
33. 
Nonetheless, criticisms and proposals to the Government remained unsuccessful.
These shortcomings sounded like an admission of failure for the government, 
which was unable to implement a form of regulation however necessary to make 
the patent system efficient, even if it was based on a liberal ideology. In fact, the 
government remained in this area subject to a spontaneous market logic and forgot 
the fact that transactions, even free, require both rules and media, even more 
involving immaterial objects. Indeed, the ideal feature of the invention took place 
long as an excuse for the Administration not to implement the hardware devices 
which were necessary in order to structure the flow of technical information. 
Private initiative, like patent agents' action, was necessary to diffuse the technical 
knowledge contained in the patents. But these actors had a paradoxical attitude : 
they refused a strong governmental presence in the system but they needed its 
involvement at least to secure the system. On the other hand, by fear of an 
increasing   bureaucracy,   governmental   was   very   reluctant   to   reinforce   its 
intervention. The controversies on the patent system explained probably a part of 
its hesitation.
From controversies to reforms 
Far from shutting down critics, the 1844 patent law fuelled a controversy which 
appeared in the second half of 1840s and was increasing with the emergence in 
Europe of new patent laws
34. In 1852, Britain expanded its patent legislation, by 
reducing the burden of taxes, reinforcing the patent publicity and establishing a 
sort of examination
35. In 1854, the new Belgian law, which defined a patent period 
for twenty years and established inexpensive and progressive annuities, caused in 
France a strong debate and called to the fore one of its ardent actors, Ambroise 
Marcelin Jobard, director of the industrial Museum of Brussels. Partisan of a 
perpetual property for the inventor, Jobard was since the mid 1840s in the core of 
a powerful polemic against Joseph Garnier, the guardian of French liberal political 
economics temple. Jobard's success, which was demonstrated by the adoption of 
the new Belgian law, encouraged more French lawyers to pronounce in favour of 
patent's perpetuity. 
Controversies
Published in the Journal des débats on August 19, 1854, an article revived a major 
controversy which was illustrated by the disagreements among French liberal 
economists about the patent system. Thus the main ancestor of liberal economists, 
Jean-Baptiste Say, supported the patents because of their positive influence in the 
development of English industry. For Say, patents were a legitimate reward for the 
1859, p.
33 Annales du Sénat et du Corps législatif, vol. 5, Du 10 au 27 mai 1865, Paris, Administration du 
Moniteur universel, 1865, p. 238, [séance du 27 mai 1865]. 
34 On these controversies at the European scale, see : Fritz Machlup and Edith Penrose, «The 
Patent Controversy in the Nineteenth Century», The Journal of Economic History, Vol. 10, No. 
1 (May, 1950), pp. 1-29 
35 H. Dutton, The Patent System and Inventive Activity During the Industrial Revolution 1750-









































36. As Say's spiritual heir and as the founder of the French Association for 
free-trade, Joseph Garnier took a similar position, without really settling the 
arguments that had emerged since Say's death
37. Another figure of the liberal 
economics, Gustave de Molinari, adopted nevertheless a clearer position by 
advocating inventor's right which would be guaranteed in its natural limits
38. By 
contrast, the young Frederic Passy expressed clearly against patents
39. In short, on 
the issue of industrial property, the French liberal school was far from being 
unanimous and the divisions caused by this issue were not confined to a clash 
between free trade and protectionism.
In fact, beyond these individual differences, there were such antinomies which 
manifested different conceptions of invention. Indeed, from similar values, like a 
work-based conception of property or the freedom of trade and labor, free trade 
economists reached different conclusions. Considering the invention as the fruit of 
an individual work conduced to recognize an inventor's property right. Refusing 
such a recognition violates the freedom to work and meant a sort of return to 
corporations. In this case, patents had to be abolished. For others invention was 
foremost collective (that was the idea put forward by Passy), each invention being 
more dependent on the social development than on individual efforts. But was not 
such a logic a way to socialism? In short, these economists were faced with the 
impossibility to establish firmly intellectual property rights and did not succeed to 
give definitive solution to the issues raised by the patent.
All these critics made necessary a reform of the patent law. In 1857, a project was 
discussed by the  Conseil d'État  but it was impossible to find an unanimous 
consent. Therefore, after the universal exhibition in 1862, the famous economist 
Michel Chevalier launched an offensive against the patent system : for him 
inventive was first of all collective and appropriation of invention had no sense. 
Consequently the reform project was forgot, but, even if it was threatened, the 
French patent system did not disappear. 
Once again the inventors' associations played an important role in the defence of 
the French patent law. Moreover, this one was defended because of political 
reasons as the Yves Guyot's book, L’Inventeur, illustrates
40. For Yves Guyot, the 
inventor was the symbol of democracy, as he said in the conclusion of his book :
« Here is the truth ! The inventor is the real king ! He does the honours ! He 
asks his qualifications to oneself ; he does not need armed forces to establish 
himself in the world ; he reigns thanks to genius, the biggest right, and with 
this genius, he changes the world, not only materially but also socially. »
41
Five years later, in the introduction of his famous treatise on industrial property, 
the lawyer Eugène Pouillet added :
36 J.-B. Say, Traité d'économie politique, ou Simple exposition de la manière dont se forment, se 
distribuent et se consomment les richesses, Paris, Deterville, 1803, p. 265. 
37 J. Garnier, Traité d'économie politique, sociale ou industrielle, Paris, 7e éd., Garnier frères, 
1873, p. 701-705. 
38 G. de Molinari, « De la propriété des inventions », Journal des économistes, 15 septembre 
1855, p. 410-430. 
39 F. Passy, « Question des brevets. Des objections que soulève la théorie du monautopole », 
Journal des économistes, 15 novembre 1854, p. 258-275. 
40 Y GUYOT, L’Inventeur, Paris, Librairie Armand Le Chevalier, 1867. As a lawyer, Yves Guyot 
was a republican opponent to the Empire.








































0“Delete patents, replace the same even  by a system of rewards whatsoever, 
do  you not see that the large manufacturer, being able once to enjoy the 
invention, will took it as quickly as possible, and playing his ordinary game, 
will crush his competitors ? [...] Where will be indeed the interest of these 
great lords to do better? They will be alone, and consumption willy-nilly be 
forced to take their products, since there will be no other. We will come back 
as a state of affairs even worse than the masters and guilds, and we will just 
have moved from an evil excess to another. Let those who call themselves 
democrats, who call themselves friends of the people, and at the same time 
calling for the abolition of patents, open their eyes. "
42
Far from being a vestige of the “privilege mentality”, the French patent law was 
seen as a democratic promise.
A new context
Moreover, the Great Depression drew the outlines of a new context. Past time for 
contemplation after the Franco-Prussian war, France saw the number of patents 
growing  rapidly,  while the abolitionist  movement that had  claimed at  the 
European level in the 1860s was slowing. Meanwhile, the last decade of the XIX
th 
century saw the emergence of a new conception of the role of the government.
During the 1870s, the number of granted patents increased quickly and the 
position of the supporters of patents became stronger, as illustrates the success of 
the Parisian Congress on industrial property in 1878. This congress was organized 
in a particular context, facing a double challenge : to end with the abolitionist 
controversy and to promote the French patent system, which was questioned by 
the Vienna Congress in 1873 and by the adoption of the new German patent law in 
1877. Thanks to the influence of the French delegation, the French tradition of the 
inventor's right based on the natural law, thereby denying any preliminary 
examination, was reaffirmed. In a sense, it was the consecration of the ideal figure 
of the individual inventor whose invention should be considered as irreducible to 
the collective nature of the progress. Ultimately, the 1878 Congress expressed the 
willingness to promote the organization of industrial property at the international 
level.
Concluded on March 20, 1883, the International Union for the Protection of 
Industrial Property, known as "Union de Paris", symbolizes the emergence of a 
global regulation. One of its fundamental contributions was primarily to compel 
each state party to consider the subjects or citizens of the Contracting States, as 
nationals. Moreover, the Convention allowed a right of priority of six months 
making the inventor able to exploit and to disseminate his invention in his country 
of origin without mortgaging its rights in other signatory countries. Among other 
provisions, the Convention provided for the creation in each signatory country of 
a special industrial property service in order to inform the public of the patents, 
trademarks and designs
43.
The French government had set in 1882 an Industrial Property Department in the 
Ministry of Trade and Industry. The creation of the Paris Union encouraged him to 
go further and the new service began publishing the  Bulletin officiel de la 
42 E. Pouillet, Traité théorique et pratique des brevets d'invention et de la contrefaçon, Paris, 
Cosse, Marchal et Billard, 1872, p. XX-XXI.
43 Yves Plasseraud et François Savignon, Paris 1883. Genèse du droit unioniste des brevets, 








































0propriété industrielle et commerciale in 1884. Now, patents were reported by a 
weekly publication. Despite this, the vast majority of patent agents continued to 
criticize the Administration for not facilitating really consultation and publication 
of patents. The smallness of the consultation rooms, the partial and impractical 
patent   publication   represented   serious   obstacles  for  prior   searches  and  for 
patenting. The government guaranteed the respect for the 1844 patent law which 
forced him to communicate free patents, still does not fulfill its mission.
The last twenty years of the XIX
th century were also assert a new thought of the 
government   symbolized   by   the   Waldeck-Rousseau's   law   in   1884,   which 
recognized trade unions, or the 1898 law on chambers of commerce and industry. 
The dialogue between government and civil organizations, which had been 
challenged   after   the   Revolution,   is   increasingly   assumed   as   such
44.   This 
redefinition of the governmental borders went along with a new conception of 
property, which ceased to be gradually reduced to a subjective right
45 and with the 
emergence of the concept of "public service"
46. The arrival of the independent 
socialist  Alexandre   Millerand   as   Ministry   of   Industry   and  Trade   in   1899 
established the conditions for a new type of dialogue between the world of 
proprietary and public authorities.
The acceleration of the dynamics of innovation and the number of patents granted 
across the world made complicated the task of private actors who had hitherto 
remedied the shortcomings of the Administration. With the development of 
technical information, patent agents were struggling for providing prior art 
searches, however, essential in the context of a system of non-screening. Gathered 
in a union in 1884, they claimed significant improvements in patent publication 
and greater state involvement. The industrialists supported these claims in favour 
of a new forms of regulation. This took place at the dawn of the new century.
A new form of regulation
The creation of the Office national de la propriété industrielle (ONPI) in 1901 
was an important compromise between governmental actors, the actors of the 
industrial property like the patent agents and the lawyers and the representatives 
of industry
47. The powers of the ONPI, in theory, were twofold. With the 1844 
patent law, its main task was to perform its administrative function in registration, 
issuing and tracking patents (as well as trademarks and designs). Furthermore, a 
technical committee advising the Minister of Trade and Industry on all matters 
concerning the industrial property while overseeing the work of the Office. Being 
represented in this committee, the private actors of industrial property became 
able to be integrated into the action of this new public service.
Thus the work of this committee prepared the adoption of a reform (April 7, 1902) 
which obliged the government to ensure complete publication of the patents. 
However, these advances were limited again by budgetary constraints  that 
prevented the ONPI from acquiring the premises and personnel necessary even 
44 Pierre Rosanvallon, Le modèle politique français, la société civile contre le jacobinisme de 
1789 à nos jours, Paris, Le Seuil, 2004, 445 p.
45 Jean-Pierre Hirsch, « L’impossible propriété collective », Steven L. Kaplan et Philippe Minard 
(dir.), La France, malade du corporatisme ? XVIIIe-XXe siècles, Paris, Belin, 2004, p. 171-194. 
46 « Le service public, l’économie, la République », Revue d’histoire moderne et contemporaine, 
special issue, n° 52-3, 2005. 








































0though its activity increased rapidly
48. While the government collected in 1905 
3 848 965 francs in taxes on patents, the ONPI received only meagre incomes. 
Thus the ONPI tended to obtain a better budget and the financial independence.
This mobilization got results.. Thus, in order to allow patent agents and inventors 
to perform prior art searches essential to their efforts, the ONPI became a centre 
of technical and legal documentation (opened on Sundays!), including all the 
French patents, the bulk of foreign patents and a library of over 15,000 books. In 
addition, George Breton, director of the Office intends to organize several times 
with the help of the Union of Engineers property attorneys legal advice sessions 
for inventors in need.
Moreover, the committee, instead of having a too narrow conception of its action, 
was driven, too, to act outside the framework established by law, practicing a 
silent examination. Indeed, in the early XX
th century, the government tended to 
oppose the granting of patents for inventions "contrary to morality.” Through the 
technical committee and the Comité consultatif des arts and manufactures, the 
Administration was reviewing certain patents even though the law continued to 
reserve that prerogative to the courts if necessary alerted by the General 
Attorney
49. By continuing illicit practice emerged from the early XIX
th century, the 
institution, despite the reform, continued to demonstrate the structural difficulty 
that IP due to the state.
Conclusion
It is impossible to consider the French patent system in the XIX
th century as a 
prolongation   of   the   privilege   systems   of   the  Ancien   régime.  Tocqueville's 
framework, which suggests strong continuity before and after the Revolution, is 
not necessary relevant in this case. The  brevets d'invention  are a powerful 
revolutionary invention. They symbolised the right of inventors as natural rights, 
the   refusal   of   an   administrative   censorship   and   the   confidence   in   market 
mechanisms in order to distinguish useful inventions from other. Indeed, the high 
cost of patent prevented small workers for protecting their inventions but it does 
not allow to consider the democratic discourse as pure ideology. Not only this 
democratic faith in the patent system allowed to resist against the abolitionist 
attacks in the 1860s but also it structured the evolution of the patent system itself, 
which became more costless.
The idea of an inefficient French patent system has however to be qualified. First, 
the patent system did not prevent the French economy to become one of the most 
important in the world and to play a strong role in the development of 
technologies during the Second Industrial Revolution. Besides, the shortcomings 
were the result of the governmental hesitations. The French patent system was 
certainly based on liberal assumption : natural right, individualistic conception of 
invention, and a government staying at the background. But to be really efficient, 
the patent system necessitated on the contrary a governmental commitment in 
order to disclose the technical information. The German patent laws of 1877 and 
1891 were based on a different conception ; they included an examination and a 
name to ONPI in 1902
48 Rapport de la Commission technique sur le fonctionnement de l’Office national de la propriété 
industrielle (avril 1908-janvier 1909), Paris, Vuibert et Nony, sd, p.35. 
49 Gabriel   Galvez-Behar,  « Les   faux-semblants  du  droit  de  l’inventeur »,  Document   pour 








































0strong patent administration without being based on a democratic conception of 
invention. In the French and German cases, the democratisation of invention was 
not linked to its efficiency.
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